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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Umali'
(decided May 6, 2008)
Isaias Umali was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree
for the murder of a security guard at a Manhattan nightclub.2 The
Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the conviction and the
New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Umali claimed

that the trial court violated his right to counsel under both the U.S.
Constitution 4 and the New York Constitution 5 "when the trial court
prohibited his attorney from speaking to him about his testimony during a trial recess." 6 The Court of Appeals held that Umali was not
deprived of his right to counsel because "the ban on attorney-client
7
communication was rescinded promptly after [Umali's] protest.",

In April 2003, Umali and his friends were at a nightclub in
lower Manhattan.8

Around the same time, a no-smoking law had

been enacted, prohibiting smoking in restaurants. 9 Dana Blake, a security guard for the nightclub, spent the night patrolling and enforc' 888 N.E.2d 1046 (N.Y. 2008).
Umali, 888 N.E.2d at 1048, 1049.
3 Id. at 1049.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, states, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
5 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6, states, in pertinent part: "In any trial in any court whatever the
party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil
actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and be confronted
with the witnesses against him or her."
6 Umali, 888 N.E.2d at 1048.
2

7 Id. at 1048.
8

id.

9 Id.
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ing the newly enacted smoking ban. He observed Umali's friends,
Jonathan and Alan Chan, smoking.10 Blake approached the two in an
attempt to get them to stop smoking, which resulted in an altercation. "
While witness accounts varied as to what exactly happened,
most recounted that "Blake grabbed [Jonathan] Chan by the throat
and pushed him toward an emergency exit."'

2

While Blake was forc-

ing Chan out of the nightclub, Umali "lunged at Blake and stabbed
13
him in his groin with a six-inch long, serrated martial arts knife."'
During the scuffle, Umali managed to leave the nightclub undetected.14
Police officers arrived at the nightclub shortly thereafter and
arrested the Chans for assault, based on witness accounts that they
were responsible for the stabbing. 15 Meanwhile, Blake was transported to a hospital and underwent surgery for a severed femoral ar16
tery, but he died later that day.
After Umali fled the scene, he "wrapped his knife in an article
of clothing and threw it in a street drain," and sought help from his
friends, the Atienza brothers.' 7 Upon arriving at the Atienzas' apartment, the brothers noticed blood stains on Umali's clothes and sug10 Id.
" Umali, 888 N.E.2d at 1048.
12 Id. Chan was "considerably smaller in stature," compared to Blake, who was over sixfeet tall and weighed approximately 350 pounds. Id.
13 Id.

14 Umali, 888 N.E.2d at 1048.
15 id.

16 Umali, 888 N.E.2d at 1048-49. Umali, upon discovering that Blake had died several
days later, attempted to commit suicide by "slashing his throat and wrists, but he survived
and was placed under psychiatric supervision." Id. at 1049.
"7 Id. at 1049.
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gested that he change clothes.18 At this point, Umali informed the
brothers that "the Chans had been in a fight with an AfricanAmerican man and that he stabbed the man using a specialized maneuver he had learned in a martial arts class." 19
The following morning, Umali's fiancee arrived at the
Atienza apartment, as Umali did not want to discuss the previous
night's events over the phone.20

It was at this point that Umali in-

formed his fianc6e that he stabbed Blake using a "special martial arts
method.

21

Shortly thereafter, the Atienzas, Umali's fiancee and an-

other man helped Umali by disposing of his bloody clothing, providing him with new clothes and cleaning his cellular phone.2 2 The individuals

involved in helping Umali entered into cooperation

agreements with the prosecution, which allowed them to "withdraw
their guilty please to hindering prosecution if they testified truthfully
and, in return, they would receive reduced charges and sentences of
probation.,

23

Two days after the stabbing, the Chans were released

from police custody and Umali "was eventually indicted for two
counts of murder in the second degree. 2 4
At his trial, Umali testified in his own defense on a Wednesday, where he raised a justification defense, reasoning that the stab-

18 Id.
19

Id. When asked about his reasoning for the stabbing, one of the brothers pleaded that

he acted in self-defense and" 'that [he] did it for the right reason.' " Id. at 1048. Umali responded that he was not acting in self-defense, and he had no reason for stabbing the nightclub bouncer. Id.
20

id.

21 Umali, 888 N.E.2d at 1049.
22 Id.
23
24

Id. at n.1.
Id. at 1049.
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bing of Blake was done to protect Chan from the deadly force of the
chokehold

However, his testimony was not finished by the end of

the day.26 This prompted the court to adjourn the trial until the next
available day, which was the following Monday.27 In addition, the
court instructed defense counsel "not [to] discuss defendant's testimony with him during the recess. '28
Defense counsel did not object to the ban until Friday morning, at which time defense counsel asked the court to reconsider the
29
ban, which was previously held improper under People v Blount.
The trial judge took the objection under advisement, and later that
morning rescinded the order. 30 This gave the defense two days to
communicate with Umali before he resumed his testimony. 3'
The trial resumed the following Monday, and ultimately the
jury convicted Umali of manslaughter in the first degree. 32 This decision was affirmed by the appellate division 33 and the New York Court
of Appeals granted leave.34 Umali argued that his right to counsel
was violated when the court prohibited him from discussing his testimony with counsel during the four-day recess and that this error

25 Id.

26 Umali, 888 N.E.2d at 1049.
27

Id. The next day was a holiday, and the court was unavailable for trial proceedings on

Friday, which was the basis for the trial
resuming on Monday. Id.
28 Id. Although the attorney was unable to speak with Umali regarding his testimony, the
court granted permission to speak to his client regarding collateral matters other than his testimony. Id.
29 Id. See infra note 94.
30 Id. The court noted that duration of time between the objection on Friday morning and
the withdrawal of the order "was no more than three hours." Id. at 1050.
3' Umali, 888 N.E.2d at 1049.
32 Id.
33 Id.

34 Id.
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was not cured when the court lifted the ban.3 5
Despite the fact that the order was issued on Wednesday, and
lifted the following Friday, the court noted that Umali's attorney was
present when the order was issued and failed to object until Friday
morning, thus the court only considered the deprivation of communication from the time the objection was made until the ban was released.36
Accordingly, the court rejected Umail's claim given the fact
that "the trial court promptly rescinded [the order] and verified that
defense counsel [was] aware they could consult with the defendant
about his testimony.',37 Further, the court stated that the time of deprivation was at most three hours, and after the ban was lifted, there
were two-and one-half days remaining before the trial would recommence, during which the defense counsel could confer with Umali. 38
Therefore, the court held that the three-hour ban was insignificant
considering the amount of time remaining until the trial resumed, and
therefore it did not warrant a reversal.39
The United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of orders prohibiting attorney-client communication in Geders v.

31Id. at 1050.
36 Umali, 888 N.E.2d at 1050. Such failure to object would render a claimed deprecation
of the constitutional right to counsel unpreserved for appellate review. Id. at 1050. In that
respect, the court stated that "consequently, in evaluating the defendant's right to counsel
argument, we do not consider the length or effect of the prohibition that occurred prior to
defense counsel's protest that Friday morning." Id. (quoting People v. Narayan, 429 N.E.2d
123 (N.Y. 1981)).
" Id. at 1050.
38 Id. Additionally, the court noted that the defense counsel never expressed any indication that additional time would be required to prepare for trial on the following Monday as a
result of the deprivation. Id.
'9Id. at 1050-51.
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United States, where the Court held that such a ban violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 40 In Geders, the defendant began testifying in his own defense on a Tuesday, and his attorney "concluded direct examination at 4:55 p.m.," that same day.41
When the trial recessed for the day, the prosecutor requested that the
judge instruct the defendant not to communicate with anyone regarding the case. 42 The trial judge agreed with the prosecutor, over counsel's objection, and told both parties: " 'I think [the defendant] would
understand it if I told him just not to talk to [defense counsel]; and I
just think it is better that [the defendant] not talk to [defense counsel]
about anything.' ,43 Despite this contention, the trial judge allowed
the defendant to discuss with his attorney matters that were not related to his prior testimony. 44 The trial concluded two days later, resulting in the defendant's conviction.45
The circuit court of appeals affirmed the conviction, 46 however, the United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding
that "an order preventing [the defendant] from consulting his counsel
'about anything' during a 17-hour overnight recess between his direct-and cross-examination impinged upon his right to the assistance

4'
41

425 U.S. 80, 91-92 (1976).
Id. at 82. The defendant in Geders was on trial for a botched plan to fly 1,000 pounds

of marijuana from Colombia into the United States, and was charged with conspiracy to import a controlled substance, importing a controlled substance, and possession of marijuana,
violating 18 U.S.C. § 371, 21 U.S.C. § 952(a), and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), respectively. Id. at
81-82.
42 Id. at 82. This was the same instruction given to every witness that testified before defendant. Id.
43 Id. (emphasis added).
44 Id. at 82.
4' Geders, 425 U.S. at 85.
46 United States v. Fink, 502 F.2d 1, 9 (5th Cir. 1974).
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The Court fully

acknowledged the purpose behind "the rule on witnesses" whereby
sequestering witnesses can prevent the possibility of witnesses tailoring their testimony, and can "prevent[] improper attempts to influ48
ence the testimony in light of the testimony already given."
However, in Geders, the defendant was "not simply a witness;
he was also the defendant., 49 The effect of the "rule on witnesses" is
considerably different when applied to a testifying defendant than to
a nonparty witness. 50 Nonparty witnesses "[have] little, other than
[their] own testimony, to discuss with trial counsel; [whereas] a defendant in a criminal case must often consult with his attorney during
the trial.,

51

Furthermore, the need to consult with an attorney is pro-

tected by the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

to have

52

The Court focused on the time and nature of the recess, which
occurred at the end of the defendant's trial, and lasted until the following morning.53 Although the trial may be over for the day,
[s]uch recesses are often times of intensive work, with
tactical decisions to be made and strategies to be reviewed. The lawyer may need to obtain from his client information made relevant by the day's testimony,
47 Geders, 425 U.S. at 91.
48

Id. at 87. Obviously, such tailoring of testimony can result in less than candid testi-

mony.
49 Id. at 88.
50

id.

51 Geders, 425 U.S. at 88.
52 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
53 Geders, 425 U.S. at 88.
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or he may need to pursue inquiry along lines not fully
explored earlier. At the very least, the overnight recess during trial gives the defendant a chance to discuss with counsel the significance of the day's
events.5 4

To combat the threat of improper influence or "coaching" witnesses,
which may be the by-product of such recesses, the Court noted that
the prosecution is not without resources to cope with such coaching. 5
The prosecution is fully afforded the opportunity to cross-examine
the witness, a tool which John Henry Wigmore, arguably the most influential jurist regarding evidence, stated is " '[b]eyond any doubt the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.' ,56
Such "[s]killful cross-examination" can exploit questions of credibility and sincerity if coaching was evident. 5 7 The judge can also take
an active part in reducing such opportunities for coaching witnesses
by forcing testimony to continue without any recesses or interruptions.58 However, the Court concluded that whatever this perceived
risk of coaching is, when it is posed against the Sixth Amendment, it
must "be resolved in favor of the right to the assistance and guidance

54 id.

" Id. at 89.
56 Wigmore's coined phrase is frequently cited and is touted from law school evidence
classes to the Supreme Court. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124 (1999); Maryland v.
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990); Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 349 (1981); see also 5
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chadburn rev. 1974).
17 Geders, 425 U.S. at 89-90.
58 Id. at 90. The court mentioned that this may not be an appropriate solution in all cases,
considering the length of some direct and cross-examinations, and crowded court dockets.
Id. at 91. However, minor inconveniences, such as delaying recesses and lunch breaks is a
reality, and "courts must frequently sit through and beyond normal recess." Id.
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of counsel."'5 9
The holding in Geders was strictly limited to overnight bans
on communication, and refused to "deal with limitations imposed in
other circumstances.,

60

Thirteen years later, the Supreme Court de-

cided Perry v. Leeke, which addressed the constitutionality of a similar order, which was shorter in duration. 61 In Perry, after the defendant concluded "his direct testimony, the trial judge declared a 15minute recess, and ... ordered that [the defendant] not be allowed to
talk to anyone, including his lawyer, during the break., 62 Upon return, defense counsel motioned for a mistrial, which was denied.63
The judge explained that the defendant" 'was in a sense then a ward
of the Court. He was not entitled to be cured or assisted or helped
approaching his cross-examination.'

"64

The Supreme Court of South

Carolina affirmed the conviction, 65 holding that "Geders was not controlling because our opinion in that case had emphasized the fact that
a defendant would normally confer with counsel during an overnight
recess and that we had explicitly stated that 'we do not deal with...
59 Id. at 91 (citing Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972)). Justice Marshall further
stated that:
If our adversary system is to function according to design, we must assume that an attorney will observe his responsibilities to the legal system, as well as to his client. I find it difficult to conceive of any circumstances that would justify a court's limiting the attorney's opportunity to
serve his client because of fear that he may disserve the system by violating accepted ethical standards. If any order barring communication
between a defendant and his attorney is to survive constitutional inquiry,
it must be for some reason other than a fear of unethical conduct.

Id. at 93 (Marshall, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
60 Id. at91.
61 488 U.S. 272, 274 (1989).
62 Id. (emphasis added).
63 Id.

Id. (quoting App. 4-5).
65 State v. Perry, 299 S.E.2d 324, 327 (S.C. 1983).
64
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limitations imposed in other circumstances.' ,,66 The United States
affirmed the state supreme
Supreme Court granted certiorari, 67 and afr
court decision, which denied counsel from speaking with his client
during a recess that is short in duration.68
While acknowledging that there is a "thin line" between Geders and Perry, the Court reasoned Geders was different because
the normal consultation between attorney and client
that occurs during an overnight recess would encompass matters that go beyond the content of the defendant's own testimony-matters that the defendant
does have a constitutional right to discuss with his
lawyer, such as the availability of other witnesses, trial
tactics, or even the possibility of negotiating a plea
bargain.

69

It is inevitable that some of the defendant's testimony would be
brought up in such conversations. 70

However, when the recess is

short in duration, such as the one in Perry, it is "appropriate to pre-

66 Perry, 488 U.S. at 274 (quoting Geders, 425 U.S. at 91). The Court further explained:

We attach significance to the words "normally confer." Normally, counsel is not permitted to confer with his defendant client between direct examination and cross examination. Should counsel for a defendant, after
direct examination, request the judge to declare a recess so that he might
talk with his client before cross examination begins, the judge would and
should unhesitatingly deny the request.
Id. at 274-75.
67 485 U.S. 976 (1988). Following the South Carolina Supreme Court decision, the defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus, in which the district court reversed the conviction, relying on United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630, 633-634 (4th Cir. 1976), which held that "it is
always reversible error for a trial court to prevent a defendant and his counsel from conferring during a recess, no matter how brief." Perry v. Leeke, 832 F.2d 837, 839 (4th Cir.
1987). The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, 832 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc),
which led to the United States Supreme Court grant of certiorari.
68 Perry, 488 U.S. at 285.
69 Id. at 284.
70 Id.
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sume that nothing but the testimony will be discussed," and the defendant is not afforded the same rights as in Geders.71
However, the Court cautioned that the existence of a short recess does not demand an automatic prohibition of communication between the defendant and his attorney.72 Rather, this is a discretionary
tool afforded to trial judges, and consultation may be allowed if it is
determined to be appropriate.7

The Court simply took the stance that

"the Federal Constitution does not compel every trial judge to allow
the defendant to consult with his lawyer while his testimony is in
progress if the judge decides that there is a good reason to interrupt
74
the trial for a few minutes.,

The Second Circuit also addressed "whether there can be a
Sixth Amendment violation when the only attorney-client communication prohibited was communication about the defendant's testimony" in United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc. ' '75 In Tri-

umph Capital, the defendant's testimony was not finished by the
trial's recess at the end of the day. 76 At this time, defendant's counsel
informed the court that he wanted to " 'talk to [the defendant] about
his testimony' and that '[he] just want[ed] to make sure that no one

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
71 Perry, 488 U.S. at 287. In the event that discussion between the attorney and defendant
is appropriate, the judge may still prohibit discussion of the ongoing testimony. Id. at 285,
n.8; see People v. Stroner, 432 N.E.2d 348, 351 (Il1. 1982) (holding that there is no violation
of right to counsel when a judge allowed discussion between defendant and attorney which
was limited to matters other than testimony during a half-hour recess).
74 Id. at 284-85.
" 487 F.3d 124, 132 (2d Cir. 2007).
76 Id. at 127.
71
72
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views that as any kind of a violation of the rules.' "" The prosecution responded that "such discussions should not be allowed" which
led the district court to order, over objection, "that defense counsel
not talk with the defendant about his testimony during the evening
recess." 78 The court recessed at 5:10 pm, which was when the prosecution "quickly realized that the court order might raise constitutional
concerns, and within twenty minutes, informed both the court and defense counsel ... that it would be researching the propriety of the restriction.,

79

Shortly thereafter, the prosecution motioned to have the order
rescinded, relying on a Seventh Circuit decision, which held that an
overnight ban on attorney-client communication was unconstitutional.80 After several unsuccessful attempts, the court was able to
reach the defendant's counsel at 8:00 p.m. and rescinded the order via
conference call.81
The following day, the court recessed in the morning before
the defendant's trial resumed, in an attempt to rectify any harm created by the restriction. 82 This recess was "meant to give [the defendant] as much time as he needed to discuss the case with his attor-

77 Id.
71 Id. at 128.
79 Id.

80 Triumph Capital, 487 F.3d at 128. See United States v. Santos, 201 F.3d 953 (2000).
The prosecution noted that the second circuit "had not spoken on the issue," yet moved to
rescind the order "even though it believed that Santos was wrongly decided." Triumph
Capital,487 F.3d at 128 n.2.
81 Id. The attorney was unable to contact the defendant until after 9:30 pm that evening,
as he was "seeking spiritual guidance" at the time. Id.
82 Id.
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ney. ' 83 However, defense counsel argued that any conversations
made at that time would not be the equivalent of speaking to his client immediately after his testimony, as the recollection of his testimony was " 'hazy.'

"84

Ultimately, the attorney conferred with his

client for forty-five minutes, and claimed that he had sufficient time
to proceed.85
Despite this affirmation, the defense attorney motioned for a
mistrial, which was denied.86 The court reasoned that the ban on
communication, which was approximately three hours in length, was
"more analogous to the brief recess and narrowly tailored prohibition
in Perry than to the overnight denial of assistance of counsel in...
Geders."87 The circuit court of appeals affirmed, stating that the relationship between Geders and Perry does not offer a "bright-line" rule
for deciding when and what communications are permissive, subjecting each case to " 'an intensely context-specific inquiry, the precise
contours of which have yet to emerge.' ,88 However, the court acknowledged that "all of the federal circuit courts that have considered
the issue have concluded that under Perry and Geders a district court
may not order a defendant to refrain from discussing his ongoing testimony with counsel during an overnight recess, even if all other

83 Id.

84 Id. The attorney also argued that he did not take any notes regarding the testimony, assuming he would have been able to communicate with his client during the evening recess.
Id. The court defended this contention by addressing the fact that counsel never requested a
transcript of the testimony which was available. Id. at 128-29.
85 Triumph Capital,487 F.3d at 129.

86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 131 (quoting Serrano v. Fischer, 412 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2005)).
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communication is allowed." 89 Alternatively, if the ban only lasted
several hours, it would have arguably been deemed trivial and it
would not have "meaningfully interfere[d] with the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right[] to effective assistance of counsel." 90 However,
the court cautioned that the focal point in its determination hinged on
the "constitutional quality of the communications affected," rather
than the duration of the ban.9'
New York courts also addressed the validity of attorney-client
bans on communication when it decided People v. Blount.92

In

Blount, the defendant was testifying in his own defense when the trial

court recessed for the weekend and "directed defense counsel, over..
.objection, not to discuss the defendant's testimony with the defendant 'at all.' ,93 The appellate division reversed, and distinguished
the case from Perry, holding that Geders controlled, and that "unrestricted access" to counsel is appropriate in the "context of a long recess." 94 The Second Department succinctly relied on the text of Ged-

'9 Id. at 132.
90 Triumph Capital,487 F.3d at 135. The court explained its basis for a ban on communication which is trivial by looking at:
[T]he totality of the circumstances, a court order banning communications during a trail recess--even if unjustified-is issued in good faith
and does not actually prevent the defendant from communicating, unfettered, with his attorney about the full panoply of trial related issues prior
to the trial resuming, nor meaningfully interferes with the quality of advice and counsel the attorney is able to provided during that recess-the
fundamental values of the Sixth Amendment that Geders protects have
not be subverted. In such limited circumstances a restriction may be
deemed trivial and judged not to amount to a Sixth Amendment violation.
Id.
91 Id. at 133 (citing United States v. Padilla, 203 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2000)).
92 552 N.Y.S.2d 441 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1990).
93 Id. at 441 (emphasis added).
94 Id. See also People v. Hagan, 446 N.Y.S.2d 91, 91 (holding that the following instruc-
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ers and recognized, as the Supreme Court did, that discussions about
testimony between the defendant and his attorney are inevitable, and
such discussions do not compromise the basic right of assistance of
counsel. 95
The court of appeals revisited the constitutionality of such
bans on communication several years later when it decided People v.
Joseph.96 In Joseph, the defendant testified on a Friday afternoon,
and at the end of the day, the trial court directed the defendant not to
communicate with his attorney regarding his testimony.97 However,
the court allowed communication regarding matters outside of the
testimony. 98 Subsequently, the jury convicted the defendant, but his
99
conviction was reversed by the appellate division.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the overnight ban
on communication violated the defendant's right to counsel under the
U.S. Constitution and the New York Constitution.100 The court relied
on Geders, emphasizing "the importance for trial preparation of
overnight discussion between defendant and client," and further
stated that "[i]t is clear that the criticalfactor in determining whether
a violation of the right to counsel occurred here is the length of time
dividing the defendant's access to counsel contemplated by the trial
tion was in violation of defendant's constitutional right to assistance of counsel: " 'I'm instructing you not to discuss with this witness

. . .

her testimony in any manner, shape or

form, and I do not think that I am depriving her of her right to counsel. She's on the stand.
She's being cross-examined, and I'm instructing you not to do it.'
96

9

Blount, 552 N.Y.S.2d. at 442.
646 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1994).

9

Id. at 808.

98 Id. This is a subtle distinction from Blount, where the court "permit[ted] defendant to
discuss with his attorney matters ... other than his own testimony. Id.
99 Id.

'oo Joseph, 646 N.E.2d at 807.
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court's ruling.'' 1° 1
The New York Court of Appeals has consistently applied
Geders and Perry in the past, which is evident in Joseph and Blount.
However, in Umali, the court of appeals stated that the "circumstances [were] comparable" to Triumph Capital.10 2 The time of the
ban was approximately three hours in each case, however the time to
rectify the mistake was two and one-half days for Umali, compared to
forty-five minutes in Triumph Capital.103 In light of these circumstances, the court in Umali held that the ban was "insignificant" and
04
therefore a reversal was not warranted.1
The holding in Umali is quite vexing. The court of appeals
seemingly picked what they liked from Triumph Capital, abandoned
the logic of Geders, and covered it up by making the same blanket
warning the second circuit made: "[O]ur decision should not be construed as permitting prohibitions on attorney-client communications
in all situations where additional time is afforded for attorney-client
discussions before testimony resumes" due to the possibility that such
restrictions may " 'substantially interfere with [the] right to effective
assistance of counsel.' ,,05

Although one can argue that the factors relied on in Triumph
Capital were completely amorphous, the court made the most sense

101Id. at 808-09 (emphasis added). The court distinguished overnight bans from temporary bans on communications that occur during brief recess throughout the day. See, e.g.,
People v. Enrique, 600 N.E.2d 229 (N.Y. 1992) (upholding a ban on communication that
occurred during a lunch recess in the middle of defendant's cross examination).
102 Umal, 888 N.E.2d at 1050.
103 id.
104 Id.
10' Id. at 1051.
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of this difficult issue by predicating its holding based on the "constitutional quality" of the banned communication rather than on the duration of the ban itself, and set forth a well reasoned standard to determine if the ban in question was "trivial."'' 0 6 This logic of the
second circuit failed to make it into the Umali opinion-instead the
court did just the opposite-it relied on the time to cure as the determinative factor rather than the quality of the communication that was
effected. Conversely, Triumph Capital emphasized that defendants'
constitutional rights must be respected. The court declined to form a
rule which would cure unconstitutional bans by simply providing the
defendant additional time to consult with counsel prior to resuming
testimony.107 Granted, the ability to cure is not irrelevant, rather it is
a factor that is viewed in "the totality of the circumstances that we
must take into account."' 1 8 However, when the Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Joseph, the court concluded its opinion by stating that "[i]t is clear that the criticalfactor in determining whether a
violation of the right to counsel occurred here is the length of time dividing the defendant's access to counsel contemplated by the trial
court's ruling," directly contradicting the logic set forth in Triumph
10 9

Capital.

It seems as if the New York courts are in limbo when issues
concern the ban on attorney-client communication.

Joseph and

Blount correctly interpret Geders and Perry as the outer limits on

106

Triumph Captial,487 F.3d at 133, 134-35.

107 Id. at 134.

108 Id.
109 Joseph, 646 N.E.2d at 809 (emphasis added).
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banned communications, ranging from fifteen minutes to seventeen
hours. However, the cases that fall in the middle of the spectrum are
exposed to the vulnerability of " 'an intensely context-specific inquiry, the precise contours of which have yet to emerge,' "due to this
lack of a "bright-line" rule.

10

Cases at the margins involving Geders

and Perry seem to be decided first, and justified in hindsight. The
loose tests and amorphous factors can be easily argued in such a way
that on any given day no consensus is found.
The court of appeals must respect the logic in Geders, which
reminded us that skillful cross-examination would combat the threat
of witness coaching and disingenuous testimony. Furthermore, the
trial judge is in a position to control the flow of the trial, and when to
take recesses. Postponing recesses may be a logical alternative, and
"convenience occasionally must yield to concern for the integrity of
'
the trial itself."111

As long as there is a lack of a bright line rule, the application
of Geders and Perry will continue to plague attorneys and criminal
defendants in New York. With respect to bans on attorney-client
communications, even the best articulated analysis can be viewed as
highly subjective and leave defendants vulnerable.
Andrew J. VanSingel

11o

Triumph Capital,487 F.3d at 131 (quoting Serrano,412 F.3d at 300).
Geders, at 425 U.S. at 91.
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RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
United States Constitution Amendment V:
No person shall.., be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself ....
New York Constitution article I, section 6:
No person shall.. . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
againsthimself or herself ....
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